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REPLY.

I am glad of Professor Wright's reply to my recent article on Lotze's Monism, for several reasons. Foremost among them I would place the fact that it enables me to emphasize what I had hoped to have sufficiently indicated in the article itself, viz., that my criticism was *not* directed against Lotze's philosophy as a whole, but against his Monism alone, and the method whereby he reaches it. Now Monism is not an original contribution of Lotze to philosophy ; on the contrary, nothing is cheaper and commoner in philosophy than Monism ; what, unhappily, is still rare, is an attempt to defend it, and critically to establish its assumptions. I selected Lotze's as one of the sanest and least distrusted statements of metaphysical Monism I had met, and tried to show by an immanent criticism that, on its own assumptions, it came to nought. But I should strenuously contend that my point might be allowed to have been fully proved without justifying talk about "wrecking" Lotze's philosophy, and without perceptibly detracting from its really original and suggestive features. It was rather because I held him to be something more and better than a mere Monist, that I considered it useful to challenge his Monism.

But I pass to the details of Professor Wright's reply. He begins by attributing to me the assertion that "the terms *world*, *coexistence*, and *interaction* are equivalent." That seems strange, for *as terms* they look different enough. But I never asserted anything of the sort. I only showed that whether we took the original *datum explicandum* as a world, as the coexistence or as the interaction of things, we could not assert the first without asserting the last, *i.e.*, that there was a logically compulsory path from the one to the other. I did not contend that Lotze pursued that path, or that he "might have" ; on the contrary, I deplored that although he *ought* to have, he did *not* : that he did *not* perceive the necessity of passing from the affirmation, 'There is a world' to '*ergo*, there is interaction.' Whence I inferred that if the former statement was no proper problem for philosophy, neither was the latter. Professor Wright thinks I stand alone in this view, and urges that earlier philosophers have scrupled to admit the second proposition after admitting the first. But many of our predecessors have had trouble also with the first, and if I am right, they need not have strained at the second any more than at the first, to which it reduces itself. So I proposed to dispose of the second question in the same way as Lotze had disposed of its

logical equivalent, the first. If in so doing I am unsupported by the authorities of the past, my argument will possess greater novelty than I had suspected; but it is really a question, not of authority, but of argument.

And my argument itself Professor Wright does not appear to contest. He does *not* contend that he can think a world in which there is no interaction, and until he does, and shows *how* he does it, I am surely entitled to maintain the logical implication of these two conceptions—whether or not this was perceived by Lotze.

Professor Wright does, however, make a statement in this connection which astounds me, when he denies that Lotze undertook to derive the interaction of the world's elements from their common unity in the Absolute. For what is it but the problem of Causation, and the necessity of explaining how one thing in the world can act on another that drives him (in the *Metaphysic*) to postulate his fundamental unity? Nor can I see the relevance of the appeal to the *Microcosmus* (*Trans.* I, p. 445), which seems to me to argue only that any system of interactions must justify the inference to a formal Unity on which it rests (this is the very point I deplored in my article, pp. 243–4!), and to enter a *caveat* only against the attempt to deduce the particular modes of interaction from a formal Unity, not as yet further determined. What, moreover, does Professor Wright say to the passage immediately preceding the paragraph from which he quotes, in which Lotze claims that “the fact that there are reciprocal actions (interactions) will compel us to believe in a real unity of all things, and a common source whence they have flowed”? I do not wish to haggle about phrases, and it is immaterial to me whether Lotze gets at the unity by ‘deriving’ or ‘explaining’ the world’s interaction, or by “indicating its rational implications”; I care only about the question whether he does or does not argue from the interactions to a unity which explains them, and is their *ratio essendi*, while they are its *ratio cognoscendi*. For I contend that he had no right to argue thus.

My criticism of Lotze’s “single truly existing Substance” was precisely analogous to that of the unity explaining interaction; *i.e.*, I accepted his criticism of the conception of Substance, just as I accepted his contention that the existence of a world as such must be granted; in both cases I tried to show that Lotze had not gone on to draw the logical inferences from his doctrines. My point was plainly that the necessity of the One as the world-ground is an illusion of the same order as that of an underlying substance, tran-

scending the activities of things. It was the conception of the unity resulting from Lotze's criticism of Substance that I tried to express by calling it "in the Many and of the Many," rather than beneath and behind the Many. But I can hardly think that Professor Wright quite appreciates this point, or meets my argument.

His misapprehensions, however, seem to become more manifest in the concluding paragraphs of his criticism, as, *e.g.*, when he charges me with regarding interaction as "a primitive datum of experience" and a "product of sense perception." Of course, I said nothing of the sort, and it ought to be clear, now at least, that I was referring throughout to the logical implications of admitted facts. Nor do I find that I have asserted any unity "existing *self-evidently* in the Many." What I did assert, for the reason stated, was that a unity of the universe needed no explanation or proof, but that it did not seem to me a valuable conception, or sufficient to establish any real Monism (p. 229). If this unity which goes without saying be, as Professor Wright holds, "a logical and metaphysical impossibility," — though I confess I cannot follow his proof of this, — so much the worse for Monism, which cannot validly be granted anything more. It is hardly worth disputing about, perhaps, but if Professor Wright seeks further information about this "possibility of interaction," I may refer him to a fuller statement of my views in *Riddles of the Sphinx*, ch. X, §§ 20–23. If, on the other hand, Monism demands more than this, and hypostasizes its unity, it reaches a One which is no longer compatible with the existence of the Many. And the reason is, as I indicated (p. 229), that as soon as we conceive the One as existing, even though *eminenter*, we inevitably construe its existence analogously to the existence which alone we know, *viz.*, that of the Many. And then the Many become unnecessary and unmeaning. Hence it is with a reaffirmation of the warning against hypostasizing the "unity of the universe," a warning which, as his concluding paragraph shows, applies also to Professor Wright, that I would take leave of his stimulating criticism of my article.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

MORALITY AND RELIGION.

With no desire to undertake the interpretation or defence of Professor Pfeiderer's theory of the relation of morality to religion, I yet wish to discuss, very briefly, the general position assumed by Professor Ritchie in her criticism of his article, contained in the November REVIEW.